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Risk analysis of production system, while the actual and appropriate data is not available, will cause wrong system
parameters prediction and wrong decision making. In uncertainty condition, there are no appropriate measures for
decision making. In epistemic uncertainty, we are confronted by the lack of data. Therefore, in calculating the system
risk, we encounter vagueness that we have to use more methods that are efficient in decision making. In this research,
using Dempster-Shafer method and risk assessment diagram, the researchers have achieved a better method of
calculating tools failure risk. Traditional statistical methods for recognizing and evaluating systems are not always
appropriate, especially when enough data is not available. The goal of this research was to present a more modern
and applied method in real world organizations. The findings of this research were used in a case study, and an
appropriate framework and constraint for tools risk were provided. The research has presented a hopeful concept for
the calculation of production systems' risk, and its results show that in uncertainty condition or in case of the lack of
knowledge, the selection of an appropriate method will facilitate the decision-making process.
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Over the last few decades, different methods of decision
making in uncertainty condition have been considered.
Among the suggested approaches, evidence theory which is
also called Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) introduces a
stronger framework for our incomplete knowledge presen-
tation and expression. The different type of available infor-
mation calls for the development of a different method to
represent and propagate the associated uncertainty. Resort-
ing to probability theory to address this issue is question-
able (Baraldi et al. 2013). The use of evidence theory started
with Dempster’s work by description of the accounting
principles of the upper and lower probabilities, and
mathematical theory of evidence was defined precisely by
Shafer (1976). However, in the last decades, Bayesian
inferences (Bayes 1763) based on previous applications are
valid, but the Dempster-Shafer studies as techniques of
modeling in uncertainty condition have had a lot of applica-
tions; various perspectives for uncertainty management
have been proposed. Buchanan and Shortcliffe (1975)* Correspondence: mkhalaj@rkiau.ac.ir
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2013proposed a model that manages uncertainty and has almost
certain factors. Hence, when our knowledge is incomplete,
uncertain approaches toward application are more appro-
priate. Fedrizzi and Kacprzyk (1988) encouraged studies in
the setting of fuzzy preference using interval value for
expressing experts' views and judgments presented through
cumulative distribution function. Each approach toward
uncertainty management has its own advantages and disad-
vantages (Lee et al. 1987). For example, Walley (1987) and
Caselton and Luo (1992) discuss the problems dealt with
Bayes common analysis which are due to the unreliability
of information, and Klir (1989) has criticized the probable
presentation of uncertainty for knowledge inference. The
DST of Dempster-Shafer (Dempster 1967) upon multidi-
mensional sources in which information is obtained from
some various sources had lots of application, and some
justifications for the appropriateness of this method for the
inference of knowledge have been indicated. Dempster-
Shafer theory has been applied successfully in various
domains such as face recognition (Ip and Ng 1994), and so
far, it has had also broad applications in the discussions of
diagnosis, statistical classification (Denoeux 1995), data
fusion (Telmoudi and Chakhar 2004), environmental
impact assessment (Wang et al. 2006), knowledge reductionn open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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2001), regression analysis (Monney 2003), multi-criterion
decision-making analyses (Bauer 1997; Beynon et al. 2001),
pattern classification (Binaghi and Madella 1999; Binaghi
et al. 2000), reasoning and logic (Benferaht et al. 2000),
medical diagnosis (Yen 1989), safety analysis (Liu et al.
2004; Wang and Yang 2001), expert systems (Beynon et al.
2001; Biswas et al. 1988), target identification (Buede and
Girardi 1997), and uncertainty (Klir and Wierman 1998).
In this study, researchers have applied the theory of
Dempster-Shafer as well in accounting for the tools failure
risk in a production organization. When failure time is un-
known, loss of production system will be occurred. Several
methods can be used to avoid the risk of failure in factories
risk, for instance, all approach such as reliability centered
maintenance (Knezevic 1997 and Moubray 1991), risk-
based inspection (Chang et al. 2005), risk-based mainten-
ance (Khan and Haddara 2003), risk-based decision making
(Carazas and Souza 2010), is related to risk management
tools. In the theoretical concept, we have applied tools,
such as Dempster-Shafer and fuzzy theory, that provide
significant patterns about the risk and reliability, and they
can be extracted from the data which originated in a
factory. If we do not have enough available data, we can use
fuzzy and precise numbers together to calculate the risk.
These results in discovering new knowledge about the
failure risk to the factory.
In real situations, what happens to production systems is
unpredictable. Hence, in decision making, we always en-
counter a risk especially with incomplete information.
Although various studies have been done concern the use
of the Dempster-Shafer's theory in systems recognition,
accounting, and decision making, yet we encounter some
problems in the application of this theory in the systems
risk assessment and making administrative decisions in real
production systems. This was the main reason of doing this
research. The purpose of the research, therefore, was to
present a composite approach for more recognition and
applied tools risk assessment and its operational evidence is
provided by accounting for the tools risk of a production
organization.
Uncertainty and information incompleteness
There are various forms of uncertainty in the amount of
uncertainties affecting the operation of the engineers, scien-
tists, and decision makers. Each group focuses on different
types of uncertainty; it is necessary before any decision
being made that their type is identified and classified de-
pending upon the amount and the correctness of available
information. In the previous decades, the probability theory
has been used as a device for accounting for modeling
uncertainty. With regard to the limitations of the probabil-
ity theory, the approaches and methods of describing and
determining the uncertainty condition now are developed,and other than probability theory, some other different
theories are proposed and used (Parsons 2001). Due to the
limitations of the probability theory, its use in risk assess-
ment is not always appropriate, especially when lack of
information causes uncertainty. There are many approaches
for accounting for uncertainty and deviation, for example,
mathematics models and simulation tools. When we en-
counter lack or incompleteness of information, some other
theories such as fuzzy set theory (Zimmermann 1991), pos-
sibility theory (Dubois and Prade 1988), Dempster-Shafer
theory, and upper and lower probabilities (Dempster 1967)
are more powerful.
In this research, the researchers' focus has been on the
use of Dempster-Shafer theory in recognizing and account-
ing for uncertainty and deciding and determination of the
system risk. In the real world, the static mathematical
models are resulted from a system full of non-deterministic
nature; their parameters become non-unique uncertainties
and a chain of uncertainties has been made in this
model. Among the available approaches and methods, the
Dempster-Shafer theory provides an appropriate recogni-
tion tool in uncertainty condition resulted from the lack of
information. This is why it uses all available data, and it also
determines and quantifies its distinctive goal precisely.
The main sources of uncertainty should be identified and
analyzed. Uncertainty is classified in two main groups -
epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty. There are
many differences between aleatory uncertainties and epi-
stemic uncertainty; aleatory uncertainty is usually named as
stochastic uncertainty, inherent uncertainty, or irreducible
uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty is usually named as
subjective uncertainty or reducible uncertainty. When there
is inherent variation of the physical system, we encounter
aleatory uncertainty. Generally, inherent variation is due
to the random nature of the input data, and it is possible
to represent it mathematically by a probability distribution
if sufficient experimental data is accessible. In non-
deterministic systems, some factors such as ignorance, lack
of knowledge, or incomplete information lead to the occur-
rence of epistemic uncertainty. The Dempster-Shafer theory
which is also called evidence theory provides an appropriate
picture of epistemic uncertainty. The advantage of using
evidence theory is in its success of quantifying the degree of
uncertainty when the amount of available information is
small. Like most of the current theories of uncertainty,
evidence theory provides two types of uncertain measure
which are known as belief and plausibility.
Identification of the sources of uncertainty is the first step
of a methodology in quantification of epistemic uncertainty
or aleatory uncertainty. Uncertainty can occur in every
phase of the modeling and simulation. Detailed up-to-date
descriptions on the various forms of uncertainty are given
in the literature (Oberkampf et al. 2001). The act of
quantifying uncertainty and variability is significant, and
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to properly illustrate them. Once enough data is on hand,
every type of variability can be represented mathematically
via probability distribution functions. There is approxi-
mately a general concurrence on this concern.
In most cases, when maintenance managers try to deter-
mine the best policy for their systems, they only consider
the cost criterion as the most important and the only
criterion to be taken into account. This is a very dangerous
point of view (Faghihinia and Mollaverdi 2012). Generally,
the most important focus of the current study is to quantify
epistemic uncertainty in maintenance engineering models
and repair, particularly to be used in multidisciplinary
systems and to apply it for design optimization.
Operational risk’s management
Operational risk's management is the central core of any
management strategy that is related to production proper-
ties. The control of operational risk depends on under-
standing it, measuring it, and knowing how to reduce it.
Accordingly, the process of managing operational risk
consists of some stages as follows: risk assessment and risk
prioritizing; identification of possible failure scenarios (each
failure scenario is estimated from the probability of failure
and the degree of consequences); prioritizing risks accord-
ing to their magnitude; estimating and dealing with the
total risk. Assessing and dealing with the degree of risk
mean managing and selecting appropriate risk response
strategy. For example, tolerable risk is accepted, and if the
estimated risk is not tolerable, it is reduced through
appropriate risk reduction approaches.
In order to estimate the risk, we should assess the risk,
and for assessment, we need the failure probability of
expected risk and the degree of consequences. Then, for
risk estimation, we use the integration and interaction of
the failure probability and the amount of loss. According to
a classical definition (Henley and Kumamoto 1981; Vose
2003), the risk of failure Ri is defined by
Ri ¼ Pf x C; ð1Þ
where Pf is the probability of failure and C is the cost given
failure for tools operation. According to the experimental
definition of probability suppose that N shows pieces of
equipment, Nf shows pieces of equipment in which is not
succeed prior to time a, since only breakdown prior to time
a is related with losses. If the amount of experiments N is
adequately large, then the entire loss caused by failures
throughout N trials is Nf ×C. The anticipated loss is
Pf ¼ Lim Nf =N
 
N→∞
Ri ¼ Nf =N
 
x C:
ð2ÞIn Equation 2, Pf is approximates the failure probability
of the machine prior to time a, also Ri is risk of systems.
Looking over the traditional analysis of risk, what is
important in assessment is having primary data for
analyzing and changing the data to the information which
determine the risk. If this data will not be available or the
least appropriate and precise data be available, the
provided analysis would not be realistic, and probably, the
outcome results could not be reliable. Therefore, quantita-
tive assessment of risk will be an appropriate device. The
risk management is a decision-making process which lack
of the data leads to weak decision making. Therefore,
whenever we could not use these tails, it is appropriate to
use semiquantitative or qualitative approaches.
Although qualitative approach of the risk estimation
needs less effort to gather information, because of its
subjectivity, it is not reliable. In the complete uncertainty
condition, using the qualitative approach of risk assess-
ment is suitable and applicable. What is investigated in
this research is the condition we have information about
the past but it is not sufficient for statistical application
and decision making including the risk. Our purpose is to
use all the data in order to increase the precision of
decisions. If the data is available, it should not be ignored,
and whenever the small data are analyzed and converted
to information appropriately, they provide appropriate
measure for decision making.
An overview of Dempster-Shafer theory
There are various methods of decision making under un-
certain conditions. Among these methods, the Dempster-
Shafer theory is a powerful method for showing and
representing uncertainty of our incomplete knowledge.
Theory of evidence allows one to combine evidence from
different sources and arrive at a degree of belief that
takes into account all the available evidence. The theory
was first developed by the Dempster's work in explaining
the principles of calculating the upper and lower
probabilities (Dempster 1967) and then its mathematical
theory developed by Shafer (1976). This theory had had a
wide range of application as a model under uncertain
conditions. Briefly, the Dempster-Shafer theory may be
summarized as follows. The primary step consists in
developing a frame of discernment Θ which is a finite set
of mutually exclusive hypotheses. Then, we can define
the m function which assigns an evidential weight to each
subset A of Θ. This function is also called basic probabil-
ity assignment.
The basic probability assignment (bpa or m) is different
from the classical definition of probability. It is defined by
mapping over the interval [0–1], in which the basic
assignment of the null set m(ø) is zero, and the summa-
tion of basic assignments in a given set A is '1′. The basic
probability assignment is called a focal point for each
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represented by
m Að Þ→ 0; 1½ 
m φð Þ ¼ 0X
A⊆Θ
m Að Þ ¼ 1:
ð3Þ
The lower and upper bounds of an interval can be
determined through a basic probability assignment, which
includes the probability of the set bounded by two non-
additive measures, namely belief and plausibility. The lower
limit of belief for a given set A is defined as the summation
of all basic probability assignments of the proper subsets B,
in which B is a subset of A. The general relation between
bpa and belief can be represented by




bel φð Þ ¼ 0
bel 1ð Þ ¼ 1:
ð4Þ
The upper bound is plausibility, which is the summation
of basic probability assignments of subsets of B, for which
A (i.e., B∩ A ≠ ø) is true, the function pl is called plausibility
and can be written as
pl Að Þ ¼
X
B∩A≠ϕ
m Bð Þ: ð5Þ
Moreover, the following relationship is true for the
belief function and the plausibility function under all
circumstances.
pl Að Þ≥bl Að Þ
pl ϕð Þ ¼ 0
pl θð Þ ¼ 1
pl Að Þ ¼ 1−bel Að Þ
ð6Þ
The belief interval represents a range where the probabil-
ity may lie. It is determined by reducing the interval be-
tween plausibility and belief. The narrow uncertainty band
represents more precise probabilities. The probability is
uniquely determined if bel(A) = pl(A), and for the classical
probability theory, all probabilities are unique. If U(A) has
an interval [0, 1], it means that no information is available,
but if the interval is [1, 1], then it means that A has been
completely confirmed by m(A).
In reality, a decision maker can often gain access to more
than one information source in order to make his or her
decisions. The evidence theory constructs a set of hypoth-
eses of known mass values from these information sources
and then computes a new set of numbers m that represents
combined evidence.
The part of DST that is of direct relevance is Dempster's
rule for combination (Zimmermann 1991). When the data
comes from different sources, through data fusion and
combination, we can summarize the results and simplify
¬them for decision making. Consider now two pieces of evi-
dence on the same frame H represented by two bpa m1
and m2 Decision maker needs a rule of combination to
generate a new bpa. This construction is called Dempster-
Shafer rule of combination for group aggregation and can
be written as
m1−2 Að ÞB∩C¼φ ¼
P
m1 Bð Þm2 Cð Þ
1−kð Þ




m1 Bð Þm2 Cð Þ
#
: ð7Þ
K represents a basic probability mass associated with
conflicts among the sources of evidence. K is often inter-
preted as a measure of conflict between the sources.
Real case study
In an automobile manufacturing supplier company, differ-
ent machines are working. An exclusive 5,000-ton hydraulic
press machine belongs to this production institute, and
there is no replacement for the above machine that in the
edited strategy of this company, possessing this machine is
considered a competitive advantage and its failures are
considered a weak point, because any failures or break in
proceedings of this machine will affect the key results of
the company's operation. As this machine is essential, so all
the parts used in this machine are also considered essential.
Because it is impossible to buy all the spare parts or to
make extra or passive systems due to the machine's
structural complexity, the reliability of the system is a
more concern of the manager of the production insti-
tute. Therefore, any break in proceedings will lead to
critical losses to the income and significance of this
financial institute. One of the other limitations is the
store accumulation which should be kept in a proper
extent. Buying and providing expensive spare parts will
reduce the risk but increase the costs and it is also
possible that these parts remain unused for years. The
management aims at assessing the likelihood of failures
through the whole press machine and since it is not
possible to have a replacement for the machine, desires
to identify the reliability and the risk in whole press by
determining the key parts' risk of break down and deci-
sions are made on it.
To begin the analysis, a part of fault tree has been drawn
in Figure 1. In this case study, three parts of the fault tree
were investigated. These three parts are the computer
which controls all the system; PLC control which is the
connector of the hardware and the software of the press;
and cushion pumps have the duty of making pressure over
the parts pressed. These parts are included as the essential
components of the production institute, which may be
defected due to exhaustion, and providing their similar
Figure 1 Fault tree of the machine.
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13 years, there are only limited data about the failures of
the control computer which is not possible to make direct
decisions through statistical methods upon them. The
director manager of this institute aims at deciding based on
the previous data and the experts' opinions about how to
react to the risk resulted from this three-part collection.
Risk-based analysis using Dempster-Shafer theory
Risk has two factors, first index is probability; it shows the
probability of occurrence of a risk in a definite period of
time. Classification of risks according to their probability of
occurrence is also possible. The classification of Table 1
shows a fuzzy categorization of relative probability of an
accident or breakdown occurring as a result of uncontrolled
riska. This table helps us to understand the importance of
an accident according to the probability of its occurrence.
It is worth mentioning that in similar categorizations, theTable 1 The information failure from sources 1 and 2
Press section Bas
Source 1
L M H L,M L,H M,H
Computer Co 0.5 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1
Cushion Cu 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.3
PLC P 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.4probability of accidents occurring can be defined in a fuzzy
way; in this mode, the data expert must gather data in a
quite precise way.
With regard to checking the data, we classified the prob-
ability of failures into three levels of magnitude: L (Low), in
which a breakdown may occur with a low probability in a
fixed period of time; M (Medium), in which a breakdown
may occur with a medium probability in a fixed period of
time; H (High), in which a breakdown may occur with a
high probability in a fixed period of time. The set of these
occurrences form the set of Θ = {L, M, H}. The possible
subsets will be eight sets of {φ},{L},{M},{H},{L,M},{L,H},
{M,H}{L,M,H}. Figure 2 shows the basic probability assign-
ment for the breakdowns probability of the production
system in fuzzy logic demonstration. On the other hand,
risk is the probability of occurrence multiplied by the mag-
nitude of damage (Equation 1). Then, the researchers define
fuzzy severity categories according Figure 2, consequencesic probability assignment
Source 2
L,M,H L M H L,M L,H M,H L,M,H
0.1 0.6 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0.1
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.1
0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.2
Figure 2 Fuzzy categories in problem.
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happens, it is removable and slight; Main (M), a failures
which will cause stopping but it is removable; Critical (C),
it is a failures which its consequence is high and if it hap-
pens it leads to a crisis. The set of events is put on in the
set of Θ = {N, M, C}. According to the above supposition,
its possible forms are put on the eight subsets of {N}, {M},
{C}, {N,M}, {N, C}, {M, C}, {N,M, C}.
The lower and upper bounds of an interval can be deter-
mined from the basic probability assignment, bpa contains
the probability set bounded by two measures belief and
plausibility, Table 2 shows the basic probability assignment
for the probability breakdowns of the production system.
By applying D-S rule of combination on sources of infor-
mation for PLC (P), the following data are generated and
can be shown as Table 3.
Degree of conflict is K = 0.27; therefore, normalization
factor is (1−K) = 0.73, in the same way, belief and plausibil-
ity functions can be determined by using corresponding
equation described earlier from the above analysis. Accord-
ing to Equation 3, it can be written as follows:
m1−2 pð ÞL ¼ 0:63 m1−2 pð ÞL;H ¼ 0:05
m1−2 pð ÞM ¼ 0:16 m1−2 pð ÞM;H ¼ 0:05
m1−2 pð ÞH ¼ 0:04 m1−2 pð ÞΘ ¼ 0:05
m1−2 pð ÞL;M ¼ 0:00:Table 2 The D-S rule of combination information from source
m1(P)L m1(P)M m1(P)H
0.4 0.3 0
m2(P)L 0.5 {L} 0.05 {φ} 0.02 {φ} 0.01
m2(P)L 0 {φ} 0.2 {M} 0.08 {φ} 0.04
m2(P)L 0.1 {φ} 0.1 {φ} 0.04 {H} 0.02
m2(P)L 0 {L} 0 {M} 0 {φ} 0
m2(P)L 0 {L} 0 {φ} 0 {H} 0
m2(P)L 0 {φ} 0.05 {M} 0.02 {H} 0.01
m2(P)L 0.4 {L} 0.1 {M} 0.04 {H} 0.02This method will be similar for other parts namely
compute ‘Co’ and cushion ‘Cu’ which can be written as
follows:
m1−2 coð ÞL ¼ 0:68 m1−2 cuð ÞL ¼ 0:34
m1−2 coð ÞM ¼ 0:17 m1−2 cuð ÞM ¼ 0:35
m1−2 coð ÞH ¼ 0:05 m1−2 cuð ÞH ¼ 0:23
m1−2 coð ÞL;M ¼ 0:00 m1−2 cuð ÞL;M ¼ 0:06
m1−2 coð ÞL;H ¼ 0:00 m1−2 cuð ÞL;H ¼ 0:00
m1−2 coð ÞM;H ¼ 0:08 m1−2 cuð ÞM;H ¼ 0:26
m1−2 coð ÞΘ ¼ 0:02 m1−2 cuð ÞΘ ¼ 0:06
k ¼ 0:40 k ¼ 0:35:
The belief and plausibility can be calculated according
Equations 4 and 6 after finding the basic probability as-
signment of each device.
Uncertainty interval for failures probability
The belief interval represents a range in which true
probability may lie. It can be determined by subtracting
belief from plausibility. The narrow uncertainty band
signifies additional strict probabilities. In conditions that U(A)
has an interval [0, 1], it denotes that no information is
on hand, but once the interval is [1, 1], at that time, it
means that A has been entirely confirmed by m(A). The
uncertainty interval for failures probability of the PLC is
presented in Table 4.s 1 and 2
m1(P)L,M m1(P)L,H m1(P)M,H m1(P)Θ
0 0.1 0.1 0.1
{L} 0 {L} 0 {φ} 0.01 {L} 0.01
{M} 0 {φ} 0 {M} 0.04 {M} 0.04
{φ} 0 {H} 0 {H} 0.02 {H} 0.02
{L,M} 0 {L} 0 {M} 0 {L,M} 0
{L} 0 {L,H} 0 {H} 0 {L,H} 0
{M} 0 {H} 0 {M,H} 0.01 {M,H} 0.01
{L,M} 0 {L,H} 0 {M,H} 0.02 Θ 0.02
Table 3 The results of belief function and the plausibility failures of PLC ‘P’
Belief function Amount Plausibility function Amount Uncertainty interval Amount
Bel1-2(p)L 0.63 Pl1-2(p)L 0.74 U1-2(p)L [0.63 to 0.74]
Bel1-2(p)M 0.16 Pl1-2(p)M 0.27 U1-2(p)M [0.16 to 0.27]
Bel1-2(p)H 0.04 Pl1-2(p)H 0.21 U1-2(p)H [0.04 to 0.21]
Bel1-2(p)L,M 0.79 Pl1-2(p)L,M 0.96 U1-2(p)L,M [0.79 to 0.96]
Bel1-2(p)L,H 0.73 Pl1-2(p)L,H 0.84 U1-2(p)L,H [0.73 to 0.84]
Bel1-2(p)M,H 0.26 Pl1-2(p)M,H 0.37 U1-2(p)M,H [0.26 to 0.37]
Bel1-2(p)Θ 1.00 Pl1-2(p)Θ 1.00 U1-2(p)Θ [1 to 1]
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the failures probability of the PLC is in the Low and
Medium levels because the range of [0.79 to 0.96] is accept-
able; similarly, we could achieve the risk function of the
computer and cushion pumps through their related data.
Uncertainty interval for consequences
Similarity, the lower and upper bounds of consequence
impact can be determined from the basic probability
assignment; summarizing and simplifying calculation is
shown in Table 5.
According to the data of basic probability allocations,
Equations 4 and 7 can be used to find the belief and plausi-
bility functions. This method is in the same way that men-
tioned in the previous section, and it is shown in Table 6.
The intervals shown in this table represent the values by
which they are approved by the existing data. For example,
regarding the cushion, the results of this table show that
the breakdown status of the machine is at the level of main
and critical. This interval is approved by the probability
interval of [0.81 to 0.91].
To determine the failure consequence of each machine
from the table of belief and plausibility functions, regarding
the computer, the results of this table show that the break-
down status of the consequence impact is at the level of
negligible and main. This interval is approved by the prob-
ability interval of [0.96 to 0.96]. The interval that has a great
belief interval will be chosen since the belief function deter-
mines a low probability that is gained through the mini-
mum available data. For example, we can show the
calculating consequence of failure as follows (see Table 7).
The risk diagram assessment
First, we have tried to draw the risk assessment diagram
which is shown in Figure 3. These diagrams are drawn for
the two selected parts of the computer and cushion pumps.Table 4 The results of uncertainty interval
Press section Uncertainty interval Amount
Computer U1-2(A)L,M [0.85 to 0.97]
Cushion U1-2(A)M,H [0.85 to 0.0.97]
PLC U1-2(A)L,M [0.79 to 0.96]In the risk assessment diagram, the x-axis is divided into
five sections of results starting negligible loss until critical
condition result. Also, y-axis shows the probability of failure
starting with Low probability until High probability in the
five sections. If enough data are available, we can use
quantitative and precise numbers for probability. But, about
the concerned case study, we are in the uncertainty
conditions and our data are insufficient. Therefore, the
non-deterministic area has been specified in the diagram.
The lower bound of this domain is determined by the belief
function and the higher bound by the plausibility function.
In the domain, the narrower the interval band, it shows
stronger probability. An example in the drawing the risk
related to the failures probability occurrence in the
computer, we get to Figure 3. According to the resulted
evidences, probability of failure in the computer has two
positions of negligible and main, and will be in the [0.2, 0.4]
domain and consequence of failures in the computer has
two positions of low and medium; finally, the risk will be in
insignificant or minor area. Here is shown the area of the
risk under uncertainty condition; for other cases, the risk
assessment diagram can be drawn.
Figure 3 shows that the risk of cushion devices is located
at the moderate and major level, while the risk of com-
puters is at the level of insignificant and major. There are
two solutions if we want to use the risk-based analysis for
controlling and reducing the risk of this equipment, (1)
decreasing the probability of failure and (2) decreasing the
consequence of failure, which will lead to the reduction of
failure risk of the equipment. In this section, decreasing the
probability of failure about the cushion will not cause
decreasing failure risk; therefore, we have to reduce the
consequence impact of failure. Figure 3 also shows in the
uncertainty condition although it cannot be determine
precise number for risk of system but risk area can be
obtained.The analysis of risk diagram assessment
In order to make decisions, the measures should be deter-
mined. However, under many conditions, the decision
information about alternatives is usually uncertain or fuzzy
due to the increasing complexity of the socio-economic
Table 5 The information consequence from sources 1 and 2
Press section Basic probability assignment
Source 1 Source 2
L M H L,M L,H M,H L,M,H L M H L,M L,H M,H L,M,H
Computer Co 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0.1
Cushion Cu 0.1 0.1 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0 0 0.4
PLC P 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 0.3 0 0 0.3
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nature of human thinking (Gui-Wu et al. 2013).
The uncertainty in the nature of fuzzy problems makes
the decision makers (DMs) find a solution so that both
feasibility and optimality conditions can be satisfied effi-
ciently (Tabrizi and Razmi 2013).
The principles of classifying the risk can be different
according to the fuzzy numbers, their nomination, the pur-
poses, aims of each class, etc. The classification presented
in the Figure 3 is the risk fuzzy area, by assigning different
classes of the system and probable failure. If an appropriate
probability distribution cannot be identified for a given
situation, it becomes extremely difficult to draw reliable
inferences about the given domain of study under investiga-
tion (Sundaram and Ramya 2013). It is possible to make a
better assessment of the existing conditions and conse-
quently prioritize the controlling actions.
Using the probability and the consequence of risks
classification system, it is possible to assess and analyze
the risk on the basis of the potential consequences and
the probability of their occurrences. From the integration
of the above two factors, risk diagram of the danger is
resulted which combines the factors in the tables of the
consequence and the probability in order to provide a
proper device for estimating acceptable level of the risk.
With the provision of a two characteristics assessment
system for risk occurrence on the basis of the conse-
quence and the probability of the risk, it is possible to
classify and assess the risk according to the degree of its
acceptability which is called as the risk diagram of theTable 6 Calculate the consequence of failure from sources 1 a
Consequence impact Computer
Bel Plu U1-2 Bel
Negligible 0.20 0.22 [0.2 to 0.22] 0.09
Main 0.75 0.76 [0.75 to 0.76] 0.12
Critical 0.04 0.04 [0.04 to 0.04] 0.54
Negligible-Main 0.96 0.96 [0.96 to 0.96] 0.21
Negligible-Critical 0.24 0.25 [0.24 to 0.25] 0.63
Main-Critical 0.78 0.80 [0.78 to 0.80] 0.81
Negligible-Main-Critical 1.00 1.00 [1 to 1] 1.00danger. In Figure 3, this diagram has been determined for
two machines in this case study.
From the risk diagram, we find that the failure risk of the
cushion for two dimension of square changing between
moderate risk to major risk. Other results pertaining to
computer is shown in diagram. Risk of computer and PLC
is in the insignificant and minor area, therefore does not
need improvement. Sometimes, we have to reduce conse-
quence impact of failure, for example, we can decrease
consequence impact with added redundancy. On cushion,
we can only decrease failure consequence of cushion, there-
fore decrease risk of failure to moderate and minor risk.
Conclusions
In the discussion of risk management, we can make sound
assessments in case we have a reasonable identification
about the uncertainty. For identification, it is necessary to
know all the factors and activities and understand all the
relevant issues. Using the analysis process, the main topic
on its factors and the analysis of each will lead to the iden-
tification of all related issues. The internal causes of failure
include poor management, lack of risk management plan-
ning, and failure to adopt a risk limit threshold (Ariful and
Des 2012). Most of time in an industry, we have the lack
of data to calculate the reliability or make a decision.
There are some main questions in any factory how risk-
based methods can be used to optimal planning of
future, and what the best model is to estimate and forecast
future. Especially, a theoretical framework, models, andnd 2
Cushion PLC
Plu U1-2 Bel Plu U1-2
0.19 [0.09 to 0.19] 0.48 0.72 [0.48 to 0.72]
0.37 [0.12 to 0.37] 0.28 0.48 [0.28 to 0.48]
0.79 [0.54 to 0.79] 0.00 0.07 [0 to 0.07]
0.46 [0.21 to 0.46] 0.93 1.00 [0.93 to 1]
0.88 [0.63 to 0.88] 0.52 0.72 [0.52 to 0.72]
0.91 [0.81 to 0.91] 0.28 0.52 [0.28 to 0.52]
1.00 [1 to 1] 1.00 1.00 [1 to 1]
Table 7 Consequence impact of failure and uncertainty
interval (U)
Computer Cushion PLC
Interval [0.96 to 0.96] [0.81 to 0.91] [0.93 to 1]
U1-2 Negligible-Main Main-Critical Negligible-Main
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to calculate risk, because there is a lack of data in a real
situation. Reliability analyses should necessarily be a risk
base linked with the losses from failures, in which decision
on allocation reliability or reallocation in uncertainty con-
dition on a basis of unknown data is new challenge. When
failure time is unknown, loss of production will be
occurred.
In the theoretical concept, we have applied tools, such as
Dempster-Shafer theory. Dissimilarity assessment is a cen-
tral problem in the DST, where the difference information
content between several evidence should be quantified
(Sarabi-Jamab et al. 2013).
Dempster-Shafer theory provides significant patterns
about the risk and reliability, and it can be extracted from
data originated in a factory. If we do not have enough
available data, we can use qualitative and precise numbers
together to calculate the risk. These results in discovering
new knowledge about the failure risk to the factory. In this
paper, due to the lack of information, we have introduced a
method that determines a range for the consequence
impact and calculates the probability of failure with relation
between the risk and reliability. Decision maker should get
to a relative certainty for assigning decisions. The uncer-
tainty is classified under two main groups which are
aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. The major
intention of this study is epistemic uncertainty which is dueFigure 3 Square diagram of risk assessment for two essential parts into the lack or incompleteness of the correct data. One of
the theories which are used for decision making in such
conditions is the evidence theory or Dempster-Shafer
theory.
Evidence theory provides a proper tool when there is
incomplete or imperfect information. In this research,
using the evidence theory, the uncertainty range of
belief and plausibility has been achieved, and this range
provides a measure for decision making in uncertainty
condition that is due to incomplete information.
Dempster-Shafer theory does not provide the limitations
of a model and is a logical expression of ignorance. As
in the assessment of real risks in the working environ-
ments, we encounter the problem of ignorance; it is
possible to reduce the degree of ambiguity and increase
the reliability of the results by integrating the qualitative
risk assessment diagram and the Dempster-Shafer the-
ory. In this investigation, the Dempster-Shafer theory
was used for the identification in uncertainty condi-
tions, and its findings were applied beside a risk diagram
for specifying the risk of a production system. Indeed,
its application in the production organizations was ex-
amined. In the qualitative approach, there is no estima-
tion on the probability of failure but it could rank in
the fuzzy logic categories; a computational intelligence
technique can provide a convenient way to represent
linguistic variables, subjective probability, and ordinal
categories. Linguistic variables are designed to describe
imprecise facts about a system and project. It is different
from the frequency of repeatable events. Hence, subject-
ive probability is a better way to represent risk as com-
pared to quantitative objective probability of failure.
Furthermore, fuzzy severity categories are more credible
than numeric scores.the fault tree.
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